Abstract-It is a central problem in secret sharing to understand the access structures of secret sharing schemes. In Chen and Kramer, secret sharing schemes from algebraic-geometric codes and their applications in secure multiparty computation were proposed and studied. For any given finite field GF(q), these secret sharing schemes are ideal ramp secret sharing schemes and allow arbitrarily many players. In this correspondence, we give the access structures explicitly for the elliptic secret sharing schemes from algebraic-geometric (AG) codes associated with elliptic curves. Based on higher degree rational points on elliptic curves, we also construct some nonideal secret sharing schemes with weighted threshold structures.
I. INTRODUCTION AND PRELIMINARIES
In a secret sharing scheme among the set of players P = fP 1 ; . . . ; P n g, a dealer P 0 , not in P, has a secret s 2 K and distributes shares si 2 Ki of the secret among the players in P such that only the qualified subsets of players can reconstruct the secret from their shares. (Here, K denotes the set of secrets and K i denotes the set of shares for player Pi, for 1 i n.) The access structure 0 2 P of a secret sharing scheme is the family of the qualified subsets of P. The information rate of this secret sharing scheme is = minflog 2 jKj=log 2 jKijg. A secret sharing scheme is perfect if the unqualified subsets of players to reconstruct the secret have no information of the secret. We call a secret sharing scheme a (k; n)-threshold scheme if the access structure consists of the subsets of at least k elements in the set P, that is, among the n players any subset of at least k players can reconstruct the secret. The first secret sharing scheme given independently by Blakley [4] and Shamir [17] in 1979 was a threshold secret sharing scheme. The existence of perfect secret sharing schemes with arbitrary given access structures was proved in [3] and [10] . If the information rate is 1, the secret sharing scheme is called ideal. It is a long standing problem to characterize the access structures of ideal secret sharing schemes (see [5] ).
In a weighted threshold secret sharing scheme, each player i is given a weight w i > 0, a subset fi 1 ; . . . ; i t g of players is qualified if and only if wi + 1 11 + wi T , where T is a threshold value. Weighted threshold secret sharing schemes have been considered in the introductory paper [17] of Shamir and studied in [1] , [2] , [6] , [14] , [15] . We will show that algebraic curves over finite fields form a natural resource to construct weighted threshold secret sharing schemes. The approach of secret sharing based on error-correcting codes was studied in [11] - [13] . Actually Shamir's (k; n)-threshold scheme is just for i = 1; . . . ; n. This is an ideal perfect secret sharing scheme. In this secret sharing scheme, the error-correcting code C is assumed to be known to every player and the dealer. We refer to [11] , [12] , and [13] for the following Lemma.
Lemma 1: (cf. [11] , [12] , and [13] Secret sharing schemes based on algebraic-geometric codes were proposed in [7] as a natural generalization of Shamir's scheme. They are so called ramp secret sharing schemes in the sense that any subset of P with fewer than t 1 players is not in the access structure and any subset of P with at least t2 players is in the access structure, for some t 1 < t 2 . Generally speaking we do not know whether a set with t elements, where t 1 t < t 2 , is qualified or not. This kind of secret sharing schemes based on AG codes allows arbitrarily many players for a constant-size base field GF(q). Moreover the gap t 2 0 t 1 is bounded by the intrinsic invariant 2g (g is the genus) of the curve. In this correspondence we give explicitly the access structures of these schemes from AG codes when the underlying curves are elliptic curves (elliptic secret sharing schemes). By using higher degree rational points on elliptic curves, we also construct some weighted threshold secret sharing schemes.
II. ACCESS STRUCTURES OF ELLIPTIC SECRET SHARING SCHEMES
In this section, we obtain the access structures of elliptic secret sharing schemes. We shall first recall some basic facts about algebraic-geometric (AG) codes. For more details, the reader may refer to [18] - [20] .
Let X be an absolutely irreducible, projective and smooth curve defined over GF(q) with genus g; D = fP 0 ; . . . ; P n g be a set of GF(q)-rational points of X and G be a GF(q)-rational divisor satis- 
code over GF(q). It is also known that C L (D; G) and C (D; G) are dual codes.
Using C = C (D; G), secret sharing schemes based on AG codes were constructed in [7] . From the results in [7] , it is known that in the 0018-9448/$25.00 © 2008 IEEE case of elliptic secret sharing schemes, i.e., where X = E is an elliptic curve and the genus g = 1, every subset with at least n 0 deg(G) + 2 elements is qualified and every subset with fewer than n 0 deg(G) elements is unqualified. In the following result, we determine explicitly which sets with n 0deg(G) or n 0deg(G)+1 elements are qualified.
In general, any qualified set is said to be minimal if none of its proper subsets is also a qualified set.
We also note that, when X = E is an elliptic curve over GF(q), the set of GF(q)-rational points on E, denoted by E(GF(q)), forms a finite abelian group with zero element O.
Theorem 1: Let E be an elliptic curve over GF(q). Let D = fP0;P1; . . . ; Png be a subset of E(GF(q)) of n + 1 nonzero elements and let G = mO. Consider the elliptic secret sharing scheme obtained from E with the set of players P = fP1; . . . ; Png.
Let A = fPi ; . . . ; Pi g be a subset of P with t elements, and let B be the element in E(GF(q)) such that the group sum of B and
PnA is a minimal qualified subset for the secret sharing scheme from C (D; G), then t m. The following fact is useful for the rest of the proof: for any t points W1; . . . ; Wt in E(GF(q)), the divisor W1 + 1 11 + Wt 0 tO is linearly equivalent to the divisor W 0 O, where W is the group sum of W1; . . . ; Wt in E(GF(q)) (see [9] If A is a subset of P such that jAj m 02, the divisor G0A has its degree deg(G 0 A) 2 (we have again identified the set A with the divisor P i + 1 11 + P i ). Hence the corresponding linear system has no base point (see [9] ). We can find a function in L(G 0 A) such that it is not zero at P 0 , thus we have a codeword in C L (D; G) which is not zero at P 0 and zero at all points of A. This implies that A c is a qualified subset. The statement 3) is proved.
Example 1: Let E be the elliptic curve y 2 + y = x 3 defined over GF (4) . This is the Hermitian curve over GF (4) , it has nine rational points and E(GF (4) ) is isomorphic to Z 3 Z 3 . We take G = 3O,
where O is the zero element in the group E(GF (4)). Let P ij be the rational point on E corresponding to (i; j) in Z3 Z3, with P00 = O. Let D = fP 10 ; P 01 ; . . . ; P 22 g = E(GF (4)) n fP 00 g and P = fP 01 ; . . . ; P 22 g = D n fP 10 3) The subsets of P with six elements and the set P are qualified.
The subsets in 1) and 2) are the minimal qualified subsets. The main result Theorem 1 can help us to construct is some ideal access structures, which can be realized by ideal perfect secret sharing schemes from elliptic curves.
Let H be a finite group which is E(GF(q)) for some elliptic curve E defined over GF(q), such that the group order jHj is an odd number. It is known that any cyclic group of p elements, where p is an odd prime, is an example of such a group (see [16] , [18] ). Let P = H n fO; W g be the set of jHj 0 2 players, where O is the zero element of H and W is any nonzero element in H. We define an access structure 0 on P as follows. Any subset of P with fewer than jHj 0 4 elements is not in 0; any subset, other than f0Wg c , with at least jHj 0 3 elements is in 0; and there are (jHj 0 3)=2 subsets, of the form fa; 0ag c , with jHj 0 4 elements in 0, where a runs over all elements in P n f0Wg.
From Theorem 1 we have the following result.
Corollary 1:
The above access structure can be realized by an ideal perfect secret sharing scheme from an elliptic curve.
Proof:
We take an elliptic curve E such that E(GF(q)) = H.
Let G = 2O; D be the jHj 0 1 nonzero elements in E(GF(q)) and any nonzero element W in D be the dealer. Using Theorem 1, 2), if A = fag is such that A c is qualified, then we must have 2a = O, which implies that a = O since jHj is an odd number. This is a contradiction since A P means that a 6 = O. Hence, we only have minimal qualified subsets with jHj 0 4 elements.
III. WEIGHTED THRESHOLD SECRET SHARING SCHEMES FROM ELLIPTIC CURVES
In this section we construct weighted threshold secret sharing schemes from higher degree rational points on algebraic curves. The constructed secret sharing schemes are not ideal in general. Let X be an absolutely irreducible, projective and smooth curve defined over GF(q) with genus g; D = fP 0 ; . . . ; P n g, where P i is a GF(q divisor of degree m satisfying supp(G) D = ;. We further assume 2g 0 2 < deg(G) < 6 n i=0 deg(P i ).
The secret sharing scheme (over GF(q)) is constructed as follows.
For any secret value s 2 GF(q), we take a function f 2 L(G) randomly such that f(P 0 ) = s. For any player P i , we have t i conjugate points P i ; (P i ); . . . ; t 01 (P i ) of P i on X. We take a normal basis e 0 = ; e 1 = q ; . . . ; e t 01 = q of the field GF(q t ) over GF(q). If f(Pi) = a0e0 + 111 + at 01et 01, then the coordinate vector of f( j (P i )) with respect to the basis e 0 ; . . . ; e t 01 , is just a cyclic shift of (a 0 ; . . . ; a t 01 ). The share of this player Pi is the vector (a0; . . . ; at 01), and the weight assigned to the player P i is wt(P i ) = deg(P i ). From the following result this is a weighted ramp secret sharing scheme over GF(q) with information rate 1=maxfwt(P1); . . . ; wt(Pn)g.
Theorem 2: Let wt(Pi) = deg(Pi) = ti. The secret sharing scheme over GF(q) as above has the following properties.
1) Any subset A of fP 1 ; . . . ; P n g satisfying 6 P 2A wt(P i ) deg(G) 0 2g is not qualified.
2) Any subset A of fP 1 ; . . . ; P n g satisfying 6 P 2A wt(P i )
Proof: Similar to Proposition 1 of [7] , a subset A of fP 1 ; . . . ; P n g is not in the access structure if and only if L(G 0 P 0 0 6 P 2A P i ) is a proper subspace of L(G 0 6 P 2A P i ).
The statements 1) and 2) follow directly.
Suppose there are n i degree t i GF(q t )-rational points in the set P defined over GF (2) . We take t 0 = 1; t 1 = pq 1 ; t 2 = pq 2 , where p; q 1 ; q 2 are distinct odd prime numbers satisfying p < q 1 < q 2 .
There are exactly 2 pq 0 2 p 0 2 q + 2 degree pq1 rational points on E and 2 pq 0 2 p 0 2 q + 2 degree pq 2 points on E. In fact, for any odd r, there are 2 r + 1 GF(2 r )-rational points of E, among which (0; 0); (0; 1) and the point at infinity O are rational over GF (2) .
Let G = mO be a GF(2)-rational divisor on E, and D be the set fP 0 ; P 1 ; . . . ; P N ; Q 1 ; . . . ; Q N g where P 0 is a nonzero GF(2)-rational point on E; N1 = (2 pq 0 2 p 0 2 q + 2)=(pq1);N2 = (2 pq 0 2 p 0 2 q + 2)=(pq 2 ); P 1 ; . 
IV. CONCLUSION
In this correspondence, we have determined the explicit access structures of the ideal linear secret sharing schemes based on AG codes associated with elliptic curves. Weighted threshold secret sharing schemes based on higher degree rational points on elliptic curves were constructed. This demonstrates that elliptic curves form an important resource in the theory of secret sharing.
